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Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political 
polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and 
the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, 
over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At 
the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between 
Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s 
ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it 
strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling 
is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system 
of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order 
which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result 
in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s 
autocratic rule.
The progressing consolidation of power in the hands of the President, who enjoys unques-
tioned authority within his party and in the state, is causing severe tensions and provoking 
an escalation in the conflict. However, Erdoğan has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to 
safely channel the disputes and use the destabilisation as an argument in favour of solidifying 
his power. This strategy has proved successful in both the social and political spheres. Skilful 
management of the migration crisis has boosted this tendency; the authorities in Ankara are 
working to strengthen cooperation with the EU on their conditions, thereby using Turkey’s 
partnership with Brussels to legitimise their domestic decisions. The major goal of Turkey’s 
dialogue with the EU, as the Turkish authorities see it, involves strengthening their legitimisa-
tion within Turkish society. This has been attained and does not seem to be threatened, even 
if Turkey’s cooperation with the EU deteriorates (for example over visa liberalisation).
The crisis as a reason to live
The government’s permanent clampdown of the 
domestic situation and its attack on the opposi-
tion, both in the parliament and outside it, have 
provoked a crisis which, according to the narra-
tive promoted by Turkey’s leadership, can only be 
resolved by introducing political change. This will 
be rubber-stamped by the thorough reconstruc-
tion of the Turkish state, which has been ongo-
ing for over a decade, combined with a reshuffle 
of the elite. In this context, the rising domestic 
tensions are serving as an argument in favour of 
strengthening presidential power.
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For the process of the state’s reconstruction1, 
which has been ongoing since 2002, a change 
in the basic law is needed which would intro-
duce a presidential system, strengthen execu-
tive power and thereby institutionalise the in-
formal rule by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
The proposed change is part of the highly ide-
ologised narrative supported by the AKP, in 
which a major role is played by the moral-eth-
ical factor; the authorities have emphasised 
the supremacy of visionary politics pursued by 
the AKP over the opportunism of the opposi-
tion groups2. The AKP’s narrative provides for 
a strengthening of executive power as a remedy 
for the inefficiency of state institutions, a move 
which is intended to boost their efficiency and 
prevent the risk of government initiatives being 
blocked by other centres of power such as the 
parliament or the judiciary. Both these spheres 
belong to the last areas of activity of the par-
liamentary opposition and the Fethullah Gülen 
movement which operates outside the National 
Assembly. Gülen himself is a preacher and busi-
nessman in exile, and his supporters used to be 
members of new Turkish elites, together with 
whom they strove to block the influence of the 
old elites associated with the military and the 
Kemalist state apparatus.
1 For more, see Marek Matusiak, The great leap. Turkey 
under Erdoğan, OSW Point of View, 27 May 2015, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2015-05-27/
great-leap-turkey-under-erdogan
2 Cf. Kürşat Bumin, AkParti ‘ahlakçı’ birharekettir, Diken, 
18 April 2016, http://www.diken.com.tr/ak-parti-ahlakci-
bir-harekettir/
The main point of this strategy involves creating 
an internal enemy whose actions would block 
the chances for implementation of long-term 
government plans. Similar motives were behind 
previous initiatives aimed at gradually remov-
ing the old establishment and neutralising the 
military, which culminated in the Ergenekon 
and Balyoz court trials3. 
However, the gradual strengthening of Erdoğan 
and his milieu leads to the polarisation of the 
political stage. The first serious symptom of this 
may have been the split within the elites, which 
resulted initially in the corruption scandal which 
broke in December 2013 and in which charges 
were brought against four then ministers, Er-
doğan himself (then Prime Minister) and his son. 
The scandal was inspired by the Gülen movement, 
and the underlying cause was the dissatisfaction 
which had been growing within the movement at 
Erdoğan’s increasingly dominant position4.
Despite the fact that the scandal failed to un-
dermine the authority of the then Prime Min-
ister or challenge his position, it became a pre-
text for an open confrontation with the group 
centred around the government camp’s former 
ally. Since the scandal emerged, numerous fig-
ures associated with Gülen have been removed 
from public life (this mainly concern officials 
holding posts in the police, the military and 
judiciary structures), and the media controlled 
by Gülen’s movement are being taken over for 
allegedly offering financial support to a ‘terror-
ist organisation’, as the government currently 
sees this group. The present stage of the battle 
with the opposition media, as part of which the 
board of administration of the Feza Gazetecilik 
Media Group, owner of Turkey’s biggest news-
3 The trials were held in 2008–2013 (Ergenekon) and 
2010–2012 (Balyoz), and focused on attempts by the 
military to overthrow the government. 257 and 325 
individuals were sentenced respectively. For more see 
Marek Matusiak, op. cit., p. 51.
4 Cf. Selin Ongun, RuşenÇakır: İslam yok ortada iktidar 
savaşıvar, Cumhuriyet, 23 November 2015, http://www.
cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/428513/Rusen_Cakir__is-
lam_yok_ortada_iktidar_savasi_var.html
In the AKP’s narrative, the strengthen-
ing of executive power is intended to be 
a remedy for the inefficiency of state 
institutions, which is expected to boost 
their efficiency and prevent the blocking 
of government initiatives.
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paper Zaman5, was recently taken over, may be 
a sign of the government’s determination both 
to fight the conservative opposition and strive 
to attain its overriding goal.
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s resignation from the party 
leadership and the post of Prime Minister fol-
lowing an extraordinary AKP party meeting on 
22 May should be viewed in a similar context. 
Even though in this case no public confronta-
tion between the Prime Minister and the Pres-
ident took place, tension between them had 
been mounting, caused by the Prime Minister’s 
attempts at political emancipation and the cre-
ation of his own powerbase within the AKP. 
Davutoğlu, an adviser to Erdoğan for many 
years, an architect of Turkey’s foreign policy 
and a party ideologist, was the last politician 
within the ruling camp who could have coun-
terbalanced the President’s influence within 
the state. In this sense, from Erdoğan’s point 
of view, as Turkey’s second most popular politi-
cian Davutoğlu could have been considered to 
pose a threat to Erdoğan’s plans to solidify his 
personal power.
The ruling camp’s ability to safely channel cer-
tain unfavourable tendencies in domestic poli-
tics, combined with its determination to change 
the political system, is well illustrated by the 
strategy the AKP has adopted towards the par-
liamentary opposition. For example, attempts 
were made to emphasise the links between the 
5 Mateusz Chudziak, Another stage of the fight with the 
media in Turkey, OSW Analyses, 9 March 2016, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-03-09/
another-stage-fight-media-turkey 
pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) 
and the Kurds of the PKK. The HDP entered the 
parliament after the June 2015 elections and de-
prived the AKP of parliamentary majority6. The 
HDP does indeed maintain contacts with the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, although the gravi-
ty of such accusations and their use for polit-
ical purposes in the renewed conflict between 
Turkey’s authorities and the PKK weakened the 
HDP’s position ahead of the November 2015 
snap elections, and as a consequence, enabled 
the AKP to regain parliamentary majority7. The 
authorities’ uncompromising stance towards 
the Kurdish rebellion has further weakened the 
HDP and boosted nationalist sentiment within 
Turkish society. This has resulted in the grad-
ual marginalisation of the Nationalist Move-
ment Party (MHP), whose ideological offer has 
been taken over by the AKP. In the context of 
increasingly likely political change, we may ob-
serve progressing stagnation on the part of the 
opposition. Neither the MHP nor the Republi-
can People’s Party (CHP), the largest opposition 
party, has been able to devise a competitive 
offer. As the whole process continues, the par-
liament is becoming marginalised, and it is ulti-
mately likely to be reduced to a place in which 
to express controlled dissatisfaction.
In this way, the internal crisis, which is being 
constantly fuelled by Erdoğan, is turning into 
a strategy intended to compromise opponents, 
hold them accountable for destabilisation, and 
thereby create arguments in favour of strength-
ening the President’s role. Following Davutoğ-
lu’s dismissal, the AKP itself is increasingly be-
coming not so much of a political party as the 
President’s powerbase, composed of loyal exec-
utors of his policy.
6 HDP’s main narrative ahead of the elections on 7 June 
2015, in which it won 80 seats and the AKP lost its parlia-
mentary majority, was its objection to introducing a presi-
dential system by way of amending the constitution.
7 With its 317 seats (in the 550-strong parliament) the 
AKP has a parliamentary majority, although 330 votes 
are needed for a constitutional referendum to be called, 
and a majority of 367 votes would be needed to pass the 
new constitution in parliament.
The AKP is winning the voters’ support by 
presenting them with a prospect of devel-
opment, stability and prosperity resulting 
from impressive economic growth, while 
on the other hand it spreads visions of in-
stability and the threat of terrorism.
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The game with the voters
The social aspect of the method of governance 
adopted by the AKP, which focuses on maintain-
ing and ultimately consolidating power, involves 
a certain kind of game which it is playing with 
the voters. On the one hand, the AKP is skilfully 
winning the voters’ support by presenting them 
with a prospect of development, stability and 
prosperity resulting from Turkey’s impressive 
economic development. On the other hand, it 
spreads a vision of instability and the threat of 
terrorism (posed by both the PKK and Islamic 
radicals). The former strategy is intended to be 
applied if the constitutional reform is carried out 
by way of a referendum. In the latter, the increase 
in potential and actual threats is presented as 
a result of actions by Turkey’s internal and exter-
nal enemies, whose destructive actions are pos-
sible only because the central authorities (includ-
ing the President himself) are not strong enough 
to counteract them.
On the one hand, the source of the AKP’s 
strength is its unquestioned successes, such as 
consistent economic growth, wide-scale infra-
structural investments and Turkey’s increased 
significance in the international arena resulting 
from a coherent and assertive foreign policy8. 
In this context, the change to the constitution 
is being presented as a necessary step towards 
strengthening the leadership to whom the Turks 
8 Despite a series of failures in the Middle East section 
of Turkey’s foreign policy, the Turkish authorities and 
pro-government media continue to promote a vision of 
Turkey as regional leader and to emphasise the country’s 
significance for its Western allies. 
owe their country’s leap in development over 
recent decades. The AKP has a massive propa-
ganda machine at its disposal9, and nurtures in 
the voters the trauma of the 1990s as a period 
of political instability, the fight with the PKK 
and the rule of coalition governments headed 
by party leaders pursuing their specific goals. 
The economic crisis which affected Turkey at 
the beginning of this century and which was 
only alleviated during the AKP’s rule10 was con-
sidered one of the results of the destabilisation 
of that period. According to this narrative, the 
party has a specific brand of know-how, which 
will also be necessary to resolve the present 
crisis. The authorities adopted this propagan-
da strategy in the aftermath of the elections of 
7 June 2015, in which the AKP lost its parlia-
mentary majority for the first time since gaining 
power. The prospect of a coalition government 
began to be associated with the above-men-
tioned trauma of the 1990s. The AKP’s electoral 
victory showed that this strategy was success-
ful at that point.
The policy based on the efficient manage-
ment of the social traumas of the late 1990s, 
which formed an element of the efforts to rub-
ber-stamp the political change, can also be il-
lustrated by a statement Erdoğan made at the 
beginning of the government’s anti-terror op-
eration in September 2015 following the bomb 
attack in Dağlıca in south-eastern Turkey. This 
later turned out to be one of a series of bloody 
attacks in Turkey in recent months. The Pres-
ident explicitly said that the attack had only 
been possible because the AKP’s power was 
9 Companies associated with the government control 
over two-thirds of Turkey’s media market. See Zülfikar 
Doğan, Turkey witnesses ‘unprecedented onslaught on 
critical media, Al-Monitor, 11 April 2016, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/turkey-akp-un-
precedented-measures-curb-critical-media.html#ix-
zz45cQdkdgZ
10 The role of Kemal Derviş is being omitted here. Derviş was 
minister of finance in the government headed by Bülent 
Ecevit, in 2001–2002 he reformed public finances, the 
results of which became apparent during the AKP’s first 
term. For more see Marek Matusiak, op. cit., p. 22.
In this context the change to the constitu-
tion is being presented as a necessary step 
towards a strengthening of the leadership 
to which the Turks owe their country’s leap 
development over recent decades.
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not strong enough11. This attack was the first 
in a series of terrorist attacks to be staged not 
only on territories affected by the fight with 
the PKK; between June 2015 and April 2016 
Turkey saw 7 suicide terrorist attacks, in which 
around 220 people were killed and several 
hundred were injured. Referring to this issue, 
pro-government media consistently claim that 
strengthening the authorities’ power would be 
the most suitable resolution to the crisis. At the 
same time, they present Turkey’s situation in 
the context of the global terrorist threat, which 
raises the universal and timeless dilemma of the 
choice between freedom and security12.
A crisis turned success
The AKP’s highly ideologised rule and its de-
termination to definitively introduce a new po-
litical order have manifested most explicitly in 
the policy the authorities are pursuing towards 
the two biggest challenges of present Turkish 
politics: the renewed conflict with the PKK and 
the migration crisis. The former has triggered 
a nationalist turn in the AKP’s policy and boost-
ed the party’s position; the latter has enabled 
an unprecedented rapprochement in Turkey’s 
relations with the European Union – on Turkey’s 
conditions. This, in turn, has resulted in Anka-
ra’s relations with Brussels becoming an instru-
ment in Turkey’s domestic policy. This is proof 
of the Turkish authorities’ ability to resolve cri-
ses in their favour.
According to calculations by the International 
Crisis Group, in the period between July 2015 
and mid-March 2016 alone, the anti-terror op-
11 Interviewed by a journalist from the pro-government TV 
station ATV, Erdoğan said: “If one party had 400 deputies 
or a sufficient number to pass a new constitution, the sit-
uation today would be completely different”. Erdoğan’dan 
Dağlıca açıklaması, Hürriyet, 6 September 2016, http://
www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogandan-daglica-aciklama-
si-30002984
12 Merve Şebnem Oruç, Freedom or security: Our era’s 
dilemma, Daily Sabah, 28 April 2016, http://www.dai-
lysabah.com/columns/merve-sebnem-oruc/2016/04/28/
freedom-or-security-our-eras-dilemma
eration claimed the lives of 350 people on the 
government forces’ side, 660 on the side of the 
PKK, as well as at least 250 civilians. Moreover, 
on territories affected by operations by the 
Turkish military and police forces (mainly the 
provinces of Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin and Şır-
nak) at least 350,000 individuals were forced to 
leave their homes13. The huge social costs of the 
operation have not posed any challenge to the 
AKP’s position, despite the progressing desta-
bilisation resulting from the conflict between 
the Kurds and Islamic State being moved onto 
Turkish territory. In this context, the authorities 
are ruling the country in a state of maximum 
emergency. Criticism from opposition groups is 
silenced on a regular basis. In addition, the HDP 
is growing increasingly weaker as a force which 
supports Kurdish terrorism, or at least chal-
lenges the unitary nature of the Turkish state14. 
Combined with the boost in nationalist senti-
ment within Turkish society and the crackdown 
on the Kurdish population, the above-men-
tioned factors have led to a hardening of the 
13 The Human Cost of the PKK Conflict in Turkey: The Case 
of Sur, Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°80, 17 March 
2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/
turkey-cyprus/turkey/b080-the-human-cost-of-the-pkk-
conflict-in-turkey-the-case-of-sur.pdf
14 In late 2015, HDP leaders attended an extraordinary meet-
ing of the Democratic Society Congress, an umbrella or-
ganisation grouping activists of legally operating Kurdish 
organisations and groups directly associated with the PKK. 
During the meeting, the HDP’s co-leader Selahattin Demir-
taş called for an autonomous entity to be established, which 
Ankara interpreted as support for self-proclaimed ‘people’s 
assemblies’ which effectively renounced their allegiance to 
the central authorities and announced autonomous entities 
in several provinces in the eastern part of the country. Ma-
teusz Chudziak, Turkey’s internal front: the conflict with the 
Kurds escalates, OSW Analyses, 30 December 2015, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-12-30/tur-
keys-internal-front-conflict-kurds-escalates
Turkey’s relations with Brussels have be-
come a tool in the country’s domestic pol-
icy. This is proof of the Turkish authorities’ 
ability to resolve crises in their favour.
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AKP’s stance, as evidenced by the recent vote 
on constitutional amendment, which will most 
likely result in stripping the Kurdish MPs of their 
immunity and eliminating the HDP from parlia-
ment. This, in turn, will open the way to the 
adoption of a new constitution. In this context, 
making the People’s Democratic Party account-
able for the destabilisation of the south-eastern 
part of the country and for offering financial 
and logistic support to local residents seems to 
be of key importance15. This is a clear message 
that the AKP is continuing to work to regain the 
Kurds’ support; for example, they may begin 
to emphasise the fact the new Prime Minister 
Binali Yıldırım is of Kurdish origin.
Aside from the conflict with the PKK, anoth-
er highly important problem generating huge 
costs and provoking internal tensions is the 
presence of around 2.7 million migrants on 
Turkish territory. According to the authorities 
in Ankara, since the beginning of the military 
operation in Syria in 2011 the government has 
spent over US$9 million on providing care of 
refugees. For the Turkish authorities, the migra-
tion crisis has become a bargaining chip in both 
domestic politics and in Turkey’s relations with 
the European Union. In the domestic aspect, 
the ‘open door’ policy towards the migrants is 
intended to demonstrate the moral suprema-
cy of the ruling elite over the liberal and left-
wing opposition which condemns Erdoğan’s 
autocratic tendencies and seeks support from 
the West16. In the foreign policy aspect, the mi-
gration issue has become an opportunity for 
15 This assistance does not always reach the residents of 
towns affected by military action. However, the authorities 
clearly state that they are fighting the terrorists, not the 
Kurds as such. See ‘The human cost…’, op. cit.
16 One example here is the opinion of the pro-govern-
ment columnist Hilal Kaplan, who accused the Turkish 
academic community of having a ‘post-colonial inferi-
ority complex’ towards the West. She contrasted this 
with the policy pursued by the AKP, which teaches the 
West humanitarianism through its approach to refu-
gees. Hilal Kaplan, ‘Post-colonial lust of some Turkish 
academics’, Daily Sabah, 23 October 2015, http://www.
dailysabah.com/columns/hilal_kaplan/2015/10/23/
post-colonial-lust-of-some-turkish-academics
Turkey to strengthen its position in its relations 
with Brussels. Efforts to conclude a cooperation 
agreement and accelerate Turkey’s process of 
accession to the EU have been advancing, but 
now on Ankara’s terms. The ruling AKP has 
monopolised the country’s relations with Brus-
sels, as evidenced by the unprecedented visit 
by German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Turkey 
amid the autumn 2015 electoral campaign. This 
means that progress in European integration 
and the efforts to achieve a strong position in 
Turkey’s relations with the EU are beginning to 
be seen as successes attributed to the ruling elite. 
The EU side, for its part, has abandoned the role 
of reviewing Turkey’s domestic policy, which in 
previous years had enabled it to influence this 
policy. In this way, in the domestic aspect, Tur-
key’s relations with Brussels have been reduced 
to a tool with which to legitimise the govern-
ment’s actions and fight the opposition.
Regardless of how the process of Turkey’s rap-
prochement with the EU ends, Ankara remains 
in pole position. Should it succeed, the position 
of the authorities is likely to strengthen and the 
opposition will become marginalised. Addition-
ally, any failure will not weaken the voters’ sup-
port for the AKP. Erdoğan’s power will remain 
strong, and will likely become ever stronger. 
The blame for the failure of the whole process 
will be put on Brussels, which additionally will 
be unable to recover the political instruments 
to influence Turkey which it had had.
The autocratic course of action adopted by 
the Turkish President will be continued, and 
the change to the constitution will legitimise 
it, most likely before the end of this year.
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Parliamentary cleansing – the final step 
towards constitutional change
As in foreign policy17, in domestic affairs the 
Turkish government has pursued a long-term 
plan which involves the ultimate introduction of 
a presidential system. This will institutionalise 
Erdoğan’s power and rubber-stamp the recon-
struction of Turkey’s socio-political order which 
has been ongoing for over a decade (aside from 
political change and the neutralisation of the 
military, this includes a reshuffle of the politi-
cal and economic elites). At present, the most 
likely development of the situation will involve 
exploiting the tensions surrounding the Kurdish 
conflict and stripping HDP deputies accused of 
supporting terrorism of their immunity, as well 
as organising by-elections in their constituen-
cies. In the situation of the crackdown on the 
Kurdish population and the forced evacuation 
of territories affected by the conflict, it should 
be expected that these MPs will be replaced 
17 Cf. Szymon Ananicz, Alone in virtue. The ‘New Turkish’ 
ideology in Turkey’s foreign policy, OSW Point of View, 
27.04.2016, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-
view/2015-04-27/alone-virtue-new-turkish-ideology-tur-
keys-foreign-policy
with AKP candidates. Another scenario pro-
vides for more early general elections, in which 
the HDP will lose (and will likely be banned). In 
this scenario as well the AKP will be likely to win 
in predominantly Kurdish constituencies. This 
variant would also enable Erdoğan to reorgan-
ise his camp once again and remove those par-
ty members who allegedly supported Davutoğ-
lu after his dismissal, in order to replace them 
with candidates loyal to the President.
The autocratic course of action adopted by the 
Turkish president will continue and the likely 
change to the constitution will legitimise it, 
most likely before the end of this year. Any fur-
ther development of the situation will depend 
on Erdoğan’s personal ambitions. This in turn 
will aggravate social polarisation and cause 
further conflicts. At the same time, Turkey will 
likely evolve in the direction of an authoritarian 
state with a strong central power and a weak 
parliament. For the EU, Turkey will remain a dif-
ficult and unpredictable partner.
